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dedicated	 to	 examining	 the	 evolving	 trends	 in	 radicalization	 among	 the	Afghan	National	Defense	 and	
Security	 Force	 (ANDSF).	 	 Since	 the	 formation	 of	 the	 defense	 and	 security	 in	 2002,	 various	 potential	
manifestations	 of	 radicalization,	 including	 insider	 attacks,	 dereliction	 of	 duty,	 and	 desertion	 have	
plagued	its	ranks.		Radicalization	is	broadly	defined	as	constraints	on	both	the	perspective	of	individuals	
and	their	 tolerance	to	 ideology	and	practices	which	diverge	and	differentiate	 from	their	own	political,	
religious	and	social	beliefs.		Making	the	distinction	between	political	deviance	(PD),	religious	extremism	
(RE),	and	social	intolerance	(SI),	1498	uniformed	rank	and	file	personnel,	151	commissioned	officers,	and	
8	uniformed	religious	 leaders	 from	among	 the	ANP	were	surveyed	on	 their	views	 toward	 the	political	
system	 in	 Afghanistan,	 anti-government	 elements	 including	 the	 Taliban,	 democracy	 in	 light	 of	 Islamic	
values,	and	women	and	human	rights.	
This	study	advances	three	overarching	conclusions.		First,	although	most	security	personnel	increasingly	
over	 the	 course	of	 their	 career	 accept	 centralized	democratic	 governance,	 conservative	 views	 leaning	
toward	 extremist	 ideology	 persists	 among	 the	 ranks	 of	 security	 force	 personnel	 in	 some	 provinces,	
namely	 Qandahar.	 	 Second,	 reliance	 on	 local	 leaders	 from	 Qandahar	 and	 similarly	 conservative	
provinces	 for	 recruit	 recommendations	 encourages	 parallel	 and	 competitive	 loyalties	 and	 ideologies	
grounded	 on	 nepotism	 and	 patronage	 relations	 among	 the	 ranks.	 	 Finally,	 while	 grievances	 and	
animosities	incited	by	favoritism	and	nepotism	have	led	to	the	relative	discredit	of	political	and	military	
leadership	 among	 security	 personnel,	 an	 overwhelming	 number	 of	 respondents	 continue	 to	 find	 the	
office	of	the	President	as	a	legitimate	source	of	authority,	suggesting	that	the	alleviation	of	corruption	is	
a	 first	 step	 toward	 building	 confidence	 and	 support	 of	 centralized	 democratic	 governance	 in	
Afghanistan.		
	
Security	 and	 defense	 forces	 are	 the	 means	 by	 which	 governments	 enforce	 law	 and	 maintain	 its	
monopoly	on	their	legitimate	use	of	force.		Failure	of	the	Afghan	government	to	develop	confidence	and	
loyalty	among	its	security	and	defense	personnel	to	the	moderate	ideology	of	the	center	not	only	runs	
the	 risk	of	 finding	 itself	both	 ideologically	and	physically	 in	opposition	 to	 its	own	well-trained	security	
and	defense	personnel,	it	more	broadly	challenges	its	domestic	sovereignty.		As	a	means	for	confronting	
such	contest	of	 its	 ideological	 legitimacy	among	the	ranks	of	the	ANP,	military	and	political	 leadership	
must	 take	 ownership	 of	 the	 vetting,	 recruiting,	 training,	 and	 oversight	 of	 personnel	 rather	 than	
tolerating	 largely	 autonomous	 and	 parallel	 structures	 of	 authority	 to	 circumvent	 its	 law	 enforcement	
obligations	and	monopoly	on	the	legitimate	use	of	force.		Failure	to	address	such	concerns	is	likely	to	be	
met	 with	 a	 return	 to	 a	 fragmentation	 state	 wherein	 largely	 autonomous	 and	 parallel	 governance	






Political	 deviance	 is	 an	 indication	 and	 measurement	 of	 dissatisfaction	 and	 resistance	 toward	 largely	
accepted	 political	 order	 and	 an	 ambition	 to	 establish	 alternative	 governance	 structures.	 	 Political	
deviance	 includes	 assessments	 of	 confidence	 in	 the	 current	 governance	 structure	 and	 views	 on	 its	
legitimacy.	
	
§ More	than	68%	of	 those	polled	believe	 that	corruption	exists	among	the	ranks	of	 the	security	










Religious	 extremism	 is	 characterized	 by	 deviations	 from	 accepted	 moderate	 religious	 views	 and	
practices	 and	a	 turn	 toward	more	extreme	 interpretations	of	 religious	doctrine.	 	Often	 the	process	 is	












Social	 intolerance	 measures	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 individuals	 are	 receptive	 to	 and	 appreciative	 of	




over	 the	 course	 of	 their	 time-in-service	 nearly	 25%	 believe	 that	 ethnic	 discrimination	 is	 a	
primary	cause	of	conflict	in	Afghanistan.	
§ Nearly	half	of	those	polled	believe	that	international	conventions	on	women	and	human	rights	
are	 not	 necessarily	 in	 line	 with	 Islamic	 values,	 with	 most	 of	 those	 coming	 from	 Kunduz	 and	
Qandahar.	
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political	 leadership	 as	 corruption	 is	 seen	 as	 justification	 for	 circumventing	 the	 authority	 of	
security	and	defense	personnel	and	taking	up	arms	against	the	leadership.		Initiatives	aimed	at	




§ Should	 revisit	 recruit	 and	 follow-on	 curriculum,	 specifically	 addressing	 the	 development	 of	
national	 consciousness	and	meeting	misunderstandings	over	 the	compatibility	of	 international	
norms	 and	 values	 and	 Afghan	 society	 and	 culture.	 	 Initiatives	 should	 standardize	 training	
programs	which	 indoctrinate	 personnel	 on	 democratic	 values,	 government	 authority,	 and	 the	




ties	with	 local	 communities	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 ongoing	 ideological	 competition.	 	 Failure	 to	
divorce	 security	 personnel	 from	 ties	 with	 their	 local	 communities	 encourages	 tensions	 and	








§ Should	oversee	 the	development	of	 initiatives	 aimed	at	 initial	 and	ongoing	evaluations	of	 the	
psychological	health	of	service	members.		Personal	grievances	and	animosities	among	members	












the	 security	 force.	 	 Since	 2008,	 green-on-blue	 incidents	 have	 largely	 demonstrated	 an	 upward	 trend	
mirroring	 an	 increasing	 ANDSF	 troop	 level	with	 its	 peak	 in	 2012	 and	 gradual	 decline	 since	 then.	 	 On	
January	29,	2015	three	US	contractors	were	killed	at	Kabul	International	Airport	when	a	service	member	
of	 the	 Afghan	 National	 Army	 (ANA)	 opened	 fire	 on	 the	 group.	 The	 Taliban	 immediately	 claimed	
responsibility,	 pointing	 out	 that	 the	 soldier	was	 a	 Taliban	 infiltrator
1
.	 	 In	 another	 incident	 on	 April	 8,	
2015,	 a	 member	 of	 the	 ANA	 opened	 fire	 on	 international	 forces	 who	 were	 escorting	 US	 diplomatic	
personnel	across	Jalalabad	after	attending	a	meeting	with	the	provincial	governor.		Two	were	killed	and	
another	 two	 were	 injured
2





the	Afghan	National	Defense	 and	 Security	 Force	 (ANDSF)	 opened	 fire	 on	 international	 trainers,	 killing	
one	of	them.				
	





.	 	However,	with	the	US	withdrawal	of	 its	 forces	
from	Afghanistan,	desertion	 rate	 in	2014	 increased	again	with	up	 to	8.5%	of	ANA	personnel	 failing	 to	
return	 to	 their	 posts
5
.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 such	 reasoning,	 the	 heaviest	 numbers	 of	 desertions	 are	 noted	
when	members	fail	 to	return	after	a	period	of	 leave,	suggesting	that	 influences	from	their	native	 local	
communities	 may	 also	 play	 a	 role	 in	 their	 decision	 to	 desert.	 	 Even	more	 concerning	 are	 desertions	
where	 service	 members	 take	 weapons	 and	 vehicles	 as	 they	 switch	 sides	 to	 ally	 with	 anti-coalition	
forces
6
.	 	 In	 combination,	 lack	 of	 confidence	 in	 defeating	 insurgents,	 questioning	 the	 righteousness	 of	
their	role,	and	decreasing	popular	support	for	the	government	all	play	a	role	in	influencing	the	decision	
to	 desert	 as	 well	 as	 the	 potential	 to	 become	 more	 receptive	 to	 counter	 and	 potentially	 radicalized	
ideology	of	opposition	forces.	
	
In	 addition	 to	 insider	 attacks	 and	desertion,	 outright	 dereliction	of	 duty	 are	 also	 reported	 among	 the	
ranks	 of	 the	 ANDSF.	 	 In	 particular,	 turning	 a	 blind	 eye
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	 to	 insurgent	 activities	 and	 carrying	 out	



















counter-terrorism.	 	 The	 ANA	 is	 manned	 by	 approximately	 167,024,	 including	 11,000	 Special	 Forces	
personnel	who	function	throughout	Afghanistan	at	the	direction	of	the	President,	while	the	Afghan	Air	









In	 response	 to	 insider	 attacks,	 desertions,	 and	 dereliction	 of	 duty,	North	 Atlantic	 Treaty	Organization	
(NATO)	officials	took	steps	to	address	concerns	with	the	introduction	of	‘guardian	angels’	to	watch	over	
international	 forces	 in	mixed	 company,	 improving	 the	 vetting	process	 as	 part	 of	 a	 counter-infiltration	
plan,	 and	 increasing	 cultural	 awareness	 among	 the	 ranks	 of	 ISAF.	 	 In	 addition	 to	monitoring	 and	 re-






The	 concept	 of	 radicalization	 has	 its	 origins	 in	 broad	 notions	 of	 tension	 and	 competition	 between	
existing	ideology	and	competing	parallel	beliefs	and	behaviors	which	often	take	on	a	violent	character	of	
disruption,	non-compliance,	and	 inevitably	a	pursuit	 to	depose	existing	order.	 	Understood	as	a	 social	
movement	of	reform,	the	process	remains	in	a	near	continuous	state,	with	each	successive	experience	
and	 event	 reconditioning	 and	 reinforcing	 such	 beliefs	 and	 behavior.	 	 As	 a	 consequence,	 one	 would	
expect	 to	 find	 increasing	 levels	 of	 radicalization	 over	 time	 as	 the	 pressures	 and	 competition	 against	
one’s	beliefs	increases.		However,	it	is	not	the	mere	difference	of	belief	and	practices	which	constitutes	
radicalization,	rather	it	is	the	taking	of	these	differences	as	a	means	for	alienation	and	violent	resistance	




RADICALIZATION = PD + RE + SI 
 
Political	deviance	(PD)	as	a	component	of	the	process	of	radicalization	is	an	indication	and	measurement	
of	 dissatisfaction	 and	 resistance	 toward	 largely	 accepted	 political	 order	 and	 an	 ambition	 to	 establish	
alternative	governance	structures.		Political	deviance	is	marked	by	civil	disobedience	and	potential	acts	
of	terrorism	wherein	individuals	or	groups	“deliberately	and	intentionally	violate	laws	and	rules	in	order	
to	 call	 attention	 to	what	 they	 perceive	 as	 being	 inherently	 unjust	 and	 oppressive”
12
.	 	 As	 a	 subject	 of	
examination	 aimed	 at	 identifying	 views	 and	 estimating	 individual	 acceptance	 of	 state	 leadership	 and	
	14	
governance,	 the	 concept	 of	 political	 deviance	 allows	 us	 to	 answer	 our	 first	 meta-question:	 to	 what	
extent	 do	 individuals	 accept	 the	 modernization	 and	 democratization	 of	 Afghanistan?	 	 In	 particular,	




Religious	 extremism	 (RE)	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 is	 characterized	 by	 deviations	 from	 accepted	 moderate	




excommunicating	 other	 Muslims	 who	 are	 perceived	 as	 having	 abandoned	 Islam
13
.	 	 As	 a	 means	 for	
gauging	 religious	 extremism,	 surveys	 aim	 to	 identify	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 individuals	 hold	 extreme	
interpretations	 of	 Islam,	 such	 as	 religious	 justification	 for	 violence,	 intolerance	 to	 non-Muslims,	
sectarian	discrimination,	and	defiance	of	democratic	principles.	
	




which	 is	 domestically	 perceived	 as	 acceptable.	 	 For	 this	 study,	 we	 examine	 the	 views	 of	 security	
personnel	 on	 such	 universals	 principles	 and	 its	 compatibility	 with	 Afghan	 values	 and	 norms.	 	 In	
particular,	 views	 on	 internationally	 accepted	 norms	 and	 values	 and	whether	 Afghans	 have	 a	 duty	 to	
adhere	 to	 these	 principle;	 views	 on	 women	 and	 human	 rights,	 including	 their	 role	 in	 society;	 and	
opinions	on	the	compatibility	of	international	norms	and	values	with	Afghan	society	are	investigated.	
	
The	 concept	 of	 radicalization	 is	 operationalized	 as	 the	 summation	 of	 the	 components	 of	 political	





religious	 extremism	 (RE),	 and	 social	 intolerance	 (SI),	 each	 of	 which	 take	 the	 following	 views,	

























ideology.	 	 In	 attempting	 to	 understand	 the	 nature	 and	 extent	 of	 their	 loyalties	 toward	 democratic	
governance	 in	 Afghanistan,	 this	 study	works	with	 the	 assumption	 that	 views	which	 diverge	 from	 the	
norms	and	values	established	under	the	constitution	demonstrates	certain	levels	of	controls	on	loyalty	
and	 commitment	 toward	 the	 central	 government	 and	 its	 rule.	 	Where	 once	 respondents	maintained	
allegiances	either	toward	local	traditional	leadership	or	the	Taliban	government,	since	the	2001	invasion	
Afghans	 were	 offered	 a	 third	 option,	 that	 of	 allegiance	 toward	 centralized	 democratic	 governance.		






Considering	 views	 on	 centralized	 democratic	 governance,	more	 than	half	 of	 those	 polled	 respect	 and	
find	legitimate	the	office	of	the	President	(57.3%)	with	more	than	three	quarters	(77.2%)	participating	in	





around	 their	 fifth	 year	 of	 service.	 	 In	 fact,	 an	 overwhelming	 96.3%	 believe	 that	 voting	 for	 political	
leadership	 in	elections	 is	 important	 for	 the	 future	of	Afghanistan.	 	However,	only	2.6%	were	 satisfied	
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animosities	 founded	 on	 the	 perception	 that	 corruption	 and	 favoritism	 exists	 among	 the	 ranks	 of	 the	
security	 and	 defense	 force	 and	 political	 leadership.	 	 More	 than	 68%	 of	 those	 polled	 believe	 that	
corruption	exists	among	the	leadership	and	ranks	of	the	ANP,	including	the	increasing	belief	with	time-
in-service	 that	 ethnic	 inequality	 (75%)	 exists	 where	 Pashtuns	 receive	 preferential	 treatment	 (24.7%).		
This	 is	 particularly	 worrying	 when	 an	 estimated	 72%	 believe	 that	 armed	 resistance	 against	 those	
believed	 to	 be	 corrupt	 is	 justified.	 	 This	 is	 heavily	 the	 opinion	 of	 those	 polled	 in	Qandahar	where	 an	
overwhelming	95.7%	believe	 that	 armed	 resistance	 is	 justified	 against	 corrupt	officials.	 	 In	 fact,	when	
asked	 what	 was	 the	 leading	 reason	 for	 defecting	 to	 the	 Taliban,	 many	 (36.8%)	 believed	 that	
dissatisfaction	with	 the	government	 rather	 than	Taliban	 influence	and	 coercion	 (21.3%)	was	 the	main	




Nonetheless,	 when	 questioned	 on	 their	
reasoning	 for	 joining	 the	 security	 force,	
most	claimed	to	have	joined	out	of	love	for	
their	country	(65%)	compared	to	those	who	
joined	 for	 economic	 incentives	 (18.5%),	
suggesting	 that	 voluntary	 affiliation	 with	
the	 security	 force	 is	 weakly	 a	 matter	 of	
money.	 	 However,	 those	 under	 forty	 years	
of	 age	 found	 joining	 for	 economic	




toward	similar	security.	 	 In	 fact,	when	we	differentiate	between	the	rank-and-file	and	officers	we	find	






security	 force	 in	 return	 for	 breaks	 in	 taxes,	 rent-free	 lands,	 and	 other	 financial	 incentives.	 	 In	 effect,	
raising	an	army	 to	protect	one’s	 sovereignty	 rested	on	negotiating	contracts	between	 leaders	of	 rural	
communities	 and	 central	 authority.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 local	 community	 benefits	 and	 economic	 gains	 for	
tribal	 leaders	 consequential	 to	 such	patronage	 relations,	 individual	 recruits	were	 also	 promised	 some	
portion	of	loot	and	the	spoils	of	war	as	was	the	case	for	raids	on	rich	Moghul	territories.		This	culture	of	
	 17	
patronage	 help	 shape	 a	 near	 institutionalized	 relationship	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	 people,	
encouraging	 more	 of	 a	 hired-hand	 mentality	 among	 the	 ranks	 rather	 than	 securing	 the	 loyalties	
necessary	to	achieving	legitimacy	and	national	consciousness.			
Although	 findings	 suggest	 that	 most	 are	 in	 favor	 of	 democratic	 governance	 and	 leadership,	
dissatisfaction	 with	 corruption	 and	 nepotism	 seems	 to	 discourage	 continued	 loyalties	 and	 in	 fact	
promotes	 a	 strong	 sense	 for	 violent	 resistance,	 especially	 in	 Qandahar,	 Ghor,	 Helmand,	 and	 Paktika.		








believe	 that	 the	 insurgency	will	 not	be	defeated.	 	Combined	with	 the	 increasing	believe	over	 time-in-
service	that	the	Afghan	government	and	politicians	are	overly	influenced	by	Western	values	(70%)	and	
that	 such	 institutions	 only	 serve	 foreign	 interests	 (8.3%),	 both	 trust	 and	 confidence	 in	 international	
forces’	 presence	 and	 success	 remains	 sparsely	 rationed.	 	 In	 fact,	when	we	 examine	 the	 potential	 for	
violent	 resistance	 against	 concerns	 that	 the	 government	 is	 overly	 influenced	 by	 the	West,	 there	 is	 a	
suggestion	that	not	only	is	violent	resistance	condoned	against	corrupt	officials	but	that	the	West	has	a	
role	 in	 such	 corruption	 and	 as	 a	 consequence	may	 also	 be	 targeted,	 especially	 in	 Helmand,	 Paktika,	
Kunduz,	and	Qandahar.							
	
This	 is	 worrisome	 when	 we	 consider	 the	 largely	 intimate	 nature	 of	 green-on-blue	 attacks.	 	 While	 it	
remains	 possible	 that	 the	 increase	 in	 incidents	 in	 2012	may	be	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 a	 Taliban	 campaign,	
more	than	84%	of	incidents	between	2008	and	2015	were	conducted	by	individuals	and	of	those,	75%	of	
attacks	 were	 directed	 largely	 against	 individual	 targets,	 suggesting	 more	 intimate	 motives	 such	 as	
grievances	 or	 disputes	 between	 assailants	 and	 their	 victims.	 	 This	 is	 in	 contrast	 to	 insider	 attacks	
perpetrated	 by	 groups	 as	 they	 are	 organized	 and	 premediated	 activities	 suggesting	 the	 existence	 of	
external	interference,	support,	and	motivations.			
	
However,	 finding	 out	 genuine	 motives	 for	 such	 attacks	 remain	 problematic	 given	 the	 limitation	 and	
ambiguity	of	evidence	and	lack	of	access.		For	example,	when	in	2010	Spanish	officers	were	targeted	and	
killed	by	their	driver	in	Badghis	province	and	riots	followed	with	hundreds	of	civilians	chanting	religious	
slogans,	 pelting	 rocks,	 started	 fires,	 and	 reportedly	 shooting	 at	 the	 base,	 any	 of	 a	 number	 of	
explanations	could	have	be	called	upon.		Two	years	later,	in	November	2012,	Spanish	soldiers	from	the	




Similarly	 in	another	 incident,	on	April	 11,	2009,	 reportedly	border	police	were	high	on	opium	when	a	
fight	 ensued	 and	 one	 policeman	was	 shot	 dead
14






to	gain	access	 to	 the	Kabul	governor’s	and	police	chief’s	offices,	 she	 identified,	 targeted,	and	at	 close	
range	shot	Dyncorp	worker,	Joseph	Griffin,	in	the	back	of	the	head.		Claims	range	from	foreign	agent,	as	





While	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 finding	out	 genuine	motives	 in	 these	 cases	will	 prove	difficult,	 all	 suggest	 that	 a	
more	nuanced	vetting	and	 recruitment	process	 is	necessary.	 	 The	 initial	buildup	of	Afghan	 forces	was	
one	of	hurried	ignorance.		As	a	consequence,	the	security	and	defense	forces	suffer	high	attrition	rates,	










contend	with	the	potential	of	reprisal	from	within.	 	 In	an	attempt	to	remedy	these	concerns,	 ISAF	and	
the	 Afghan	 Ministry	 of	 Interior	 implemented	 a	 re-vetting	 process	 as	 a	 means	 to	 reexamining	 and	
weeding	out	problem	cases	from	the	ANDSF.	
However,	ongoing	reliance	on	 local	 leaders	 for	recruitment	recommendations	continue	to	trouble	and	
challenge	 the	 vetting	 and	 recruiting	 process	 with	 implicit	 nepotism	 and	 competing	 allegiances	 and	
ideologies.	 	Appointed	by	relatives,	recruits	often	receive	preferential	 treatment,	 including	sympathies	
in	the	field	and	under	conflict	conditions	wherein	relatives	are	pardoned	from	conducting	their	duties	–	
namely	 during	 engagements	with	 insurgents.	 	 Not	 only	 does	 this	 demotivate	 others	 from	 conducting	
their	 duty,	 it	 also	 leads	 to	 hostility	 among	 the	 ranks,	 including	 against	 allied	 forces	 serving	 alongside	
these	individuals.		In	fact,	as	the	composition	of	the	security	and	defense	force	is	largely	determined	by	
local	 tribal	 leaders,	 security	 and	 defense	 personnel	 tend	 to	 remain	 loyal	 to	 their	 local	 communities.		
Making	 matters	 worse,	 when	 posted	 to	 their	 own	 local	 communities,	 loyalties	 are	 questionable	 as	
security	 personnel	 fraternize	 with	 locals	 and	 prioritize	 requests	 from	 local	 leaders	 over	 that	 of	 the	
central	government	and	allied	 forces	operating	 in	country.	 	Under	conditions	where	 ideologies	greatly	
differ,	competing	priorities	may	lead	to	violent	resistance	and	retaliation.			
This	 split	 between	allegiances	 to	 the	 ideologies	of	 centralized	democratic	 governance	and	 that	of	 the	
periphery	 becomes	 more	 obvious	 when	 we	 polled	 members	 on	 their	 future	 ambitions.	 	 Of	 those	























time-in-service	 categories	 with	 respondents	 from	 Kunduz	maintaining	 a	 strong	 and	 consistent	 belief,	
with	Qandahar	 and	Nangarhar	 trailing	 slightly	 behind.	 	 Such	 findings	 suggests	 that	most	 believe	 that	
defeat	of	 the	 insurgency	will	 conclude	with	
some	 form	 of	 power	 sharing	 between	 the	
Taliban	and	the	central	government.		In	fact,	
when	 asked	 what	 the	 future	 held	 for	 the	
Taliban,	 a	 small	 portion	 of	 the	 population	
argued	 that	 they	 will	 win	 (1.4%),	 with	 the	
greatest	 number	 of	 those	 from	 Kunduz	
believing	 so	 (6.5%).	 	 Nonetheless,	 the	
majority	 of	 those	with	 over	 seven	 years	 of	
service	increasingly	disagreed	with	such	conclusions.	 
 
Taking	 advantage	 of	 the	 management	 practices	 of	 the	 security	 and	 defense	 force,	 local	 Taliban	
representatives	 find	 the	 practice	 of	 posting	 security	 personnel	 close	 to	 their	 home	 districts	
accommodating	as	they	use	their	 familiarity	and	access	to	family	members	as	a	means	of	 influence	or	




rates	 stands	 at	 approximately	 25%.	 	 While	 posting	 ANP	 personnel	 to	 their	 local	 home	 communities	
comes	with	 its	 benefits,	 such	 as	 an	 intimate	 familiarity	which	 provides	 an	 intelligence	 advantage	 and	
limits	on	potential	abuse	of	the	local	community,	counter-influence	on	local	Taliban	members	remains	
limited.	 	 Arguably,	 this	 is	 on	 account	 of	 the	 stigma	 associated	with	 arresting	 relatives	 and	 neighbors,	
including	dishonoring	family	and	neighbors.		Although	preventing	desertion	remains	a	major	challenge,	
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the	 Taliban	 create	 the	 opportunity	 for	 service	 member	 to	 be	 influenced	 and	 convinced	 of	 their	
legitimacy.	
Further	 corroborating	 such	 conclusions,	 preliminary	 findings	 from	 interviews	 conducted	 with	 senior	
officials	 within	 the	 security	 and	 defense	 force	 revealed	 frustrations	 over	 the	 central	 government’s	
administration	and	policy	 toward	 its	military	and	police	 force.	 	 In	particular,	 interviewees	believe	 that	






With	 increases	 of	 green-on-blue	 attacks,	 especially	 in	 2012,	 NATO	 revisited	 the	 vetting	 process	 and	
made	 adjustments	 to	 improve	 on	 screening	 out	 potential	 radical	 elements	 from	 the	 ANDSF.	 	 The	
updated	 vetting	 process	 consists	 of	 eight	 steps,	 including	medical	 and	drug	 screening,	 biometric	 data	
collection	 and	 check,	 personal	 information	 and	 photo	 collection,	 recommendations	 and	 guarantor	 of	
personal	 information	 verification	 from	 two	 local	 leaders,	 valid	 Afghan	 identification	 card,	 criminal	
records	 check,	 and	validation	 from	 recruiting	authority
20
.	 	However,	not	all	 provinces	benefitted	 from	







§ Although	 more	 than	 half	 of	 those	 polled	 have	 confidence	 in	 the	 office	 of	 the	 President	 and	
nearly	 80%	participated	 in	 elections,	 perceived	 corruption	 and	 favoritism	 among	 the	 ranks	 of	
the	security	and	defense	force	and	political	leadership	generates	the	grievances	and	animosities	
which	 encourage	 service	 members	 to	 turn	 to	 the	 Taliban	 and	 other	 sources	 of	 moral	
governance.			
§ While	 more	 than	 68%	 believe	 that	 corruption	 exists	 among	 political	 and	 military	 leadership,	
another	72%	believe	that	armed	resistance	against	corrupt	officials	is	justified.	





§ While	 approximately	11%	 joined	 the	 security	 force	with	 the	objective	 to	 securing	Afghanistan	
against	 Taliban	 influence,	 nearly	 20%	 joined	 primarily	 for	 economic	 incentives.	 	 As	 a	
consequence,	many	maintain	a	hired	hand	mentality	rather	than	national	consciousness.	
§ A	majority	of	green-on-blue	 incidents	were	of	a	personal	and	 intimate	nature,	 suggesting	 that	
individual	grievances,	mental	states,	and	ideological	beliefs	are	the	underlying	motives.	
§ Many	of	 those	polled	believe	 that	 the	 future	of	Afghanistan	will	 see	 a	power	 sharing	 scheme	
between	 the	 central	 government	 and	 the	 Taliban.	 	 Posting	 service	 members	 to	 their	 home	
district	only	further	encourage	Taliban	influence	and	convincing	of	their	legitimacy.	
	





democracy.	 	 As	 a	 means	 for	 excavating	 such	 details,	 surveys	 focused	 on	 capturing	 and	 measuring	






justified	 if	 officials	 are	 seen	 as	 criticizing	 Islam.	 	 In	 particular,	 those	 from	Qandahar	 strongly	 believed	
that	Muslims	have	an	obligation	to	take	action	against	those	who	break	with	Islamic	law	and	that	armed	







part	of	planned	 suicide	missions.	 	On	one	hand,	 there	were	a	 relatively	 small	 number	 (5%)	of	 suicide	
bombers	 and	 self-inflicted	 small	
arms	 suicides	 which	 may	 be	
interpreted	 as	 motivated	 by	
underlying	 extremist	
interpretations	 and	 radical	
ideology.	 	 On	 the	 other,	
perpetrators	may	have	chosen	to	







service,	 more	 than	 67%	 of	
those	polled	believe	that	most	
religious	 faiths	 provide	 a	
positive	 contribution	 to	
society,	 while	 nearly	 90%	
believe	that	all	 religious	 faiths	
are	worthy	of	respect.		In	fact,	
when	 examining	 views	 on	
more	 intimate	 relations	
between	 Muslims	 and	 non-Muslims	 nearly	 90%	 believe	 that	 Muslims	 are	 allowed	 to	 enter	 into	
negotiations	and	peace	agreements	with	non-Muslims,	while	a	similar	number	approve	of	non-Muslims	
moving	 into	 their	 neighborhoods	 and	 even	 next	 door	 with	 an	 estimated	 75%	 believing	 that	 it	 is	
permitted	to	eat	at	the	same	table	with	non-Muslims.		However,	nearly	80%	of	these	same	respondents	
also	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 a	 duty	 of	 all	Muslims	 to	 establish	 a	 Caliphate,	 suggesting	 that	 there	 is	 a	 belief	
among	 members	 of	 the	 security	 force	 that	 tolerance	 to	 other	 religions	 and	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	
Caliphate	are	not	contentious	or	contradictory.	
Similarly,	of	those	surveyed	nearly	98%	believe	that	all	religious	sects	(mazha)	and	their	practices	should	






are	 increasingly	conforming	to	change	with	greater	sectarian	tolerance,	especially	 in	 response	to	both	





However,	 ethnic	 tension	 exists	 and	 is	
reported	 as	 a	 comparatively	 much	
stronger	 reason	 for	conflict	 than	religion,	




that	 ethnic	 inequality	 exists	 among	 the	
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ranks	of	 the	security	 force;	 those	 from	Herat,	Kunduz,	Bamyan,	and	Paktika	claim	more	so	 than	other	
provinces.	
This	 is	 particularly	 worrying,	 especially	 when	 considering	 the	 potential	 limitations	 in	 the	 reach	 and	
exercise	of	the	duty	of	security	and	defense	personnel	in	ethnically	sensitive	environments.	In	fact,	any	









Paktia	province	believe	 that	 the	Taliban	were	once	good	 religious	 leaders	while	 those	 from	Qandahar	
and	Helmand	province	 remained	more	optimistic	of	 Taliban	 religious	 credentials	with	more	 than	13%	
from	each	 province	 finding	 that	 the	 Taliban	 follow	 true	 Islamic	 values.	 	 Such	 findings	 suggest	 that	 of	
those	polled,	respondents	from	Paktia,	Qandahar,	and	Helmand	hold	the	most	conservative	views	with	
Kunduz,	Balkh,	and	Paktika	following	slightly	behind	with	an	average	of	25%	from	each	province	trusting	
in	the	religious	 leadership	of	the	Taliban.	 	When	we	consider	that	 less	than	12%	of	security	personnel	
claim	to	have	 joined	with	the	main	 intention	of	countering	the	 insurgency,	these	findings	suggest	that	
sympathy	toward	the	Taliban	exists	among	the	ranks	of	the	security	force.		Of	particular	interest	is	that	
of	those	polled,	more	than	79%	believe	that	establishing	a	caliphate	is	a	duty	of	all	Muslims,	suggesting	
that	 a	 large	 portion	 of	 the	 security	 force	
find	 religion	 as	 a	 guiding	 governance	
principle	 –	 some	 provinces	 much	 more	
conservatively	than	others.		However,	while	
much	 of	 Western	 interpretation	
erroneously	 believe	 that	 establishing	 a	
caliphate	 means	 domination	 over	 other	
religions,	 it	 is	 more	 commonly	 understood	
by	Muslims	as	the	process	of	spreading	the	
word	 and	 developing	 brotherhood	 in	 the	











more	 than	 those	 from	 other	 provinces	 finding	 that	 democracy	 is	 largely	 not	 compatible	with	 Afghan	
society	 while	 believing	 that	 the	
establishment	of	 a	 caliphate	 is	 a	duty	of	 all	
Muslims,	 suggesting	 a	 relatively	 stronger	
believe	 that	 religious	 leadership	 without	
democracy	 is	 the	 preferred	 governance	
form	 for	 Afghanistan.	 	 Surprisingly,	 those	
from	 Qandahar	 find	more	 than	 those	 from	











up	 to	 the	 Second	 World	 War	 Afghanistan	 remained	 relatively	 isolated,	 it	 was	 exactly	 such	 isolation	
which	 encouraged	 the	 people	 to	 appreciate	 their	 Afghan	 culture	 and	 ultimately	 come	 to	 reject	 the	
extremes	of	both	the	Muslim	Brotherhood	and	communism.	
	
As	 part	 of	 his	 2011	 Eid	 message,	 then	 Taliban	 leader	 Mullah	 Mohammad	 Omar	 acknowledged	 that	




ranks	 of	 the	 enemy	 according	 to	 the	 plan	 given	 to	 them	 last	 year”
24
,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 increase	 in	
incidents	during	2012	was	a	direct	consequence	of	his	plan	and	orders.	 	 In	fact,	11	of	the	45	or	nearly	
25%	of	 green-on-blue	 incidents	 in	2012	were	 conducted	by	groups	of	 security	 and	defense	personnel	
and	not	lone	actors,	suggesting	coordination	and	preplanning.		Moreover,	4	out	of	the	11	insider	attacks	








suggest	 that	 those	 from	 Paktia	 may	 put	 up	 armed	 resistance	 against	 criticism	 to	 Taliban	
ideology.	
	 25	
§ Similarly,	 a	 handful	 of	 those	 from	 Paktika	 and	 Paktia	 find,	 more	 than	 those	 from	 other	
provinces,	 that	suicide	attacks	are	a	 justified	 form	of	armed	resistance	suggesting	 further	 that	
criticism	of	Taliban	ideology	in	these	provinces	may	be	met	with	suicide	attacks.	
§ More	than	76%	of	those	polled	from	Qandahar	believe	that	armed	resistance	is	justified	even	in	
the	 presence	 of	 security	 personnel,	 suggesting	 that	 many	 believe	 the	 security	 force	 may	 be	
circumvented	in	the	process	of	standing	up	for	religion.		
§ Although	this	study	finds	that	most	are	tolerant	of	ethnic	and	religious	differences,	increasingly	
nearly	 25%	 believe	 that	 ethnic	 discrimination	 is	 a	 primary	 cause	 of	 conflict	 in	 Afghanistan.		
Arguably,	such	conditions	limit	the	reach	of	security	personnel	on	account	of	their	ethnicity.	
§ Relative	to	other	provinces,	those	from	Paktika	and	Kunduz	find	more	so	that	democracy	is	not	





On Social Intolerance: International Norms and Values, Women and Human Rights, and 
Afghan Society 
 
The	 social	 intolerance	 indicator	 estimates	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 individuals	 are	 receptive	 to	 and	
appreciative	of	internationally	accepted	norms	in	general	and	more	specifically	the	extent	to	which	they	
find	it	compatible	with	Afghan	culture.		In	particular,	we	examine	views	on	international	conventions	on	
women	 and	 human	 rights	 and	 the	 right	 of	 intervention	 in	 the	 case	 of	 violations;	 the	 relationship	





When	 polled	 on	 the	 rights	 of	 women,	
nearly	95%	believed	that	women	should	be	
allowed	 to	 serve	 as	 ministers	 while	 92%	
submitted	 that	 Afghan	 values	 agree	 to	
women	taking	part	in	political	activities.	 	 In	
fact,	89%	claimed	that	they	would	work	for	
a	 woman	 commander.	 	 Moreover,	 near	
similar	 numbers	 claim	 that	 they	 have	 no	
problem	 with	 marrying	 employees	 of	 the	
government	 or	 civil	 society	 organizations	
(85%).	 	 However,	 while	 91%	 believe	 that	
both	 men	 and	 women	 have	 the	 right	 to	
freely	 express	 their	 opinions,	 a	 smaller	
number	believe	that	Islam	allow	for	women	to	work	outside	the	home	(84%).		Although	most	believed	
that	girls	should	attend	school	(98.9%)	and	90%	believe	that	violence	against	women	is	not	acceptable,	





Examining	 respondents’	 views	 on	 international	 conventions	 on	 women	 and	 human	 rights,	 surveys	
suggest	 that	 relative	 to	 other	 province,	 Qandahar	maintained	 a	 relatively	 higher	 level	 of	 intolerance	
across	 all	 time-in-service	 categories	 where	 approximately	 60%	 of	 those	 polled	 believed	 that	 Afghans	
have	 no	 obligations	 to	 agree	with	 or	 accept	 international	 conventions	 on	women	 and	 human	 rights.		
Kunduz	 also	 remained	 relatively	 high	 with	 nearly	 40%	 believing	 similarly	 up	 to	 the	 seventh	 year	 of	
service	 with	 increasing	 agreement	 and	 acceptance	 of	 international	 conventions	 thereafter.		
Respondents	 from	 Qandahar	 similarly	 felt	 relatively	 stronger	 against	 allowing	 women	 to	 serve	 as	
ministers,	 with	 increasing	 intolerance	 up	 to	 the	 seventh	 year	 of	 service	 where	more	 than	 14%	were	
against	women	serving	as	ministers.		Thereafter,	slow	acceptance	took	hold.		When	questioned	on	their	
views	 on	 whether	 women	 could	 more	 broadly	 take	 part	 in	 political	 activities,	 respondents	 from	
Qandahar	 again	 exhibited	 relatively	 stronger	 sentiments	 against	 women	 participating	 in	 political	




Again,	 when	 asked	 if	 they	 would	 consider	 working	 for	 a	 woman	 commander,	 most	 provinces	
increasingly	with	time-in-service	agreed.	 	However,	both	Qandahar	and	Nangarhar	remained	relatively	
high	 in	disagreement,	with	 those	 from	Qandahar	 increasingly	 negative	between	 their	 fifth	 to	 seventh	
years	of	service,	followed	by	a	slow	rate	of	approval	thereafter.			
	






traditions	 of	 Afghan	 culture	 and	 Islam,	 Qandahar	 and	 Ghor	 both	maintained	 relatively	 high	 levels	 of	
agreement	across	all	time	frames,	while	Nangarhar,	and	Paktia	saw	a	decrease	in	agreement	up	to	the	
fourth	year	of	service	followed	by	relatively	consistent	agreement.	 	Respondents	from	other	provinces	





When	 asked	 if	 they	 believed	 that	 Afghans	
have	 a	 duty	 to	 follow	 international	
conventions	 on	 women	 and	 human	 rights,	
more	 than	 80%	 agreed,	 with	 this	 number	
increasing	with	time-in-service.		In	fact,	more	
than	 70%	 agreed	 that	 the	 international	
community	 has	 the	 right	 to	 intervene	 and	
prosecute	 violators	 of	 the	 international	
conventions	 on	 women	 and	 human	 rights.		
However,	when	asked	whether	international	
norms	 and	 values	 were	 in	 line	 with	 Islamic	





received	only	 religious	 education.	 	 In	 fact,	 increasing	 education	 levels	 saw	 increasing	 agreement	with	
both	 the	duty	 to	 follow	 internationally	accepted	norms	and	values	and	 the	 international	 community’s	






Considering	 Islamic	values	and	 its	 compatibility	with	 internationally	accepted	norms	and	values,	while	
up	 to	 the	 seventh	 year	 of	 service	 Nangarhar	 saw	 increasing	 acceptance	 of	 international	 norms	 and	
values,	 Qandahar	 demonstrated	 the	
contrary	with	more	than	14%	believing	that	
international	 norms	 and	 values	 are	 not	 in	
line	 with	 Islamic	 values.	 	 When	 asked	
whether	 Muslims	 could	 make	 peace	
agreements	with	non-Muslims,	respondents	
from	 both	 Ghor	 and	 Qandahar	 disagreed	
across	 most	 of	 time	 frames,	 only	 tapering	
off	 beyond	 the	 ten	 year	 mark	 while	





hand,	more	 than	 half	 of	 those	 polled	 disagreed	 that	 traditional	 law	 and	 jirga	 supersede	 international	
norms	 and	 values.	 	 However,	 Qandahar	 again	 ranked	 high	 with	 more	 than	 42%	 submitting	 that	
traditional	 Afghan	 law	 supersede	 international	 law.	 	 Only	 25%	 believed	 that	 international	 law	 could	
replace	 domestic	 national	 laws,	 with	
nearly	60%	disagreeing.	 	With	 regard	
to	 domestic	 jurisdiction	 over	women	
and	 human	 rights,	 more	 than	 60%	
believe	 that	 sharia	 law	 is	 the	 final	
authority	on	the	matter,	while	central	
government	 authority	 fell	 in	 second	
place	 with	 19%	 believing	 that	
jurisdiction	and	 final	authority	 rested	
in	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 President	 and	
legislature.			
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International	 intervention	 undoubtedly	 introduces	 some	 level	 of	 competition	 between	 domestic	 and	
international	 values	 and	 ideologies,	 while	 the	 level	 of	 domestic	 receptivity	 determines	 the	 extent	 to	









§ While	more	 than	 90%	 believe	 that	 violence	 against	 women	 is	 not	 acceptable,	more	 than	
80%	 of	 those	 polled	 from	 Qandahar	 approve	 of	 physically	 reprimanding	 women	 for	
disobeying	Islamic	law	or	disrespecting	Afghan	tradition	and	culture.	
§ Approximately	60%	of	 those	 from	Qandahar	and	40%	of	 those	 from	Kunduz	believed	 that	
Afghans	have	no	obligations	 to	agree	with	or	accept	 international	 conventions	on	women	
and	human	rights.	
§ Nearly	half	 (48%)	believe	that	 international	conventions	on	women	and	human	rights	may	
not	 necessarily	 be	 in	 line	with	 Islam;	 60%	of	 this	 same	 population	 received	 only	 religious	
education.	 	 In	 fact,	 increasingly	 with	 education	 levels,	 there	 is	 agreement	 on	 the	
compatibility	of	Islam	with	international	conventions.	
§ Nearly	 73%	agree	 that	 sharia	 law	 supersede	 international	 conventions	with	60%	believing	
that	sharia	law	has	final	jurisdiction	and	authority	over	women	and	human	rights.	
	
 Relative Level of Radicalization across Provinces 
 
Examining	 the	 relative	 level	 of	
radicalization	 across	 provinces,	
this	 study	 finds	 that	 Qandahar	 is	
the	most	conservative	province	of	
the	eleven	with	most	respondents	
holding	 relatively	 stronger	 views	
of	 social	 intolerance,	 religious	
extremism,	and	political	deviance.		
Paktika	 ranked	 second	 to	
Qandahar	 with	 regard	 to	 social	
intolerance,	while	Ghor	 ranked	 second	 against	Qandahar	with	 regard	 to	 religious	 extremism.	 	On	 the	
measure	 of	 political	 deviance,	 Helmand	 ranked	 second	 after	 Qandahar	 with	 Kunduz,	 Paktika,	 and	
Nangarhar	 following	 closely	 behind.	 	 In	 particular,	 while	 the	 views	 on	 the	 rights	 of	 women	 and	 the	
acceptability	of	 international	norms	and	values	varied	across	provinces,	more	than	80%	of	 those	 from	
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Qandahar	 approved	 of	 physically	 reprimanding	 women	 for	 disobeying	 Islamic	 law	 or	 disrespecting	
Afghan	 tradition	and	 culture,	while	nearly	half	of	 those	polled	 from	Qandahar	and	more	 than	30%	of	












This	 study	 concludes	 that	 while	 most	 security	 personnel	 over	 the	 course	 of	 their	 career	 accept	
centralized	 democratic	 governance,	 conservative	 views	 leaning	 toward	 extremist	 ideology	 persists	
among	the	ranks	of	security	force	personnel	in	some	provinces.			
	
§ While	 survivorship	 bias	 is	 a	 reasonable	 consideration	when	 examining	 individual	 provinces	 in	
absolute	terms,	in	relative	terms	findings	suggest	that	differences	across	provinces	are	a	result	
of	 influences	 native	 and	 specific	 to	 provinces	 and	 differentiated	 programming	 of	 personnel	
across	ANP	posts.		In	fact,	service	members’	response	to	the	inherent	tension	and	competition	
between	 local	 influence	 and	 that	 of	 the	 central	 government	 authority	 manifest	 in	 their	
obligations	as	security	personnel	serves	as	a	measurement	tool	of	their	political	deviance.			
	
§ As	 indications	 of	 the	 extent	 of	 political	 deviance,	 local	 influences	 from	 the	most	 conservative	
provinces,	such	as	Qandahar,	not	only	contest	security	personnel	meeting	their	obligations,	but	
also	support	direct	and	violence	defiance	of	military	and	political	leadership.		Not	only	does	such	
influence	 limit	 the	 reach	 of	 the	 central	 government	 and	 the	 enforcement	 of	 law,	 it	 also	
advocates	 extremist	 and	 violent	 behavior	 which	 ultimately	 undermines	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	




where	 extreme	 ideology	 persists	 among	 security	 personnel	who	 elect	 to	 defect	 back	 to	 their	
local	communities	and	its	leadership.	
	
§ In	 some	 of	 the	 most	 conservative	 provinces,	 such	 as	 Kunduz	 where	 many	 believe	 that	
democracy	 is	 not	 compatible	 with	 Islam,	 and	 Paktia	 and	 Paktika	 where	 nearly	 10%	 of	 those	
polled	believe	 that	 suicide	attacks	are	a	 justified	 form	of	armed	resistance,	 counter-narratives	
must	contend	with	and	meet	the	geographical	distance	and	spillover	of	ideology	from	bordering	




consciousness	 in	 these	 provinces	 demand	 more	 than	 the	 standard	 indoctrination	 of	 security	
personnel	as	ideological	competition	is	at	its	fiercest	in	these	provinces.	
	
§ Grievances	 and	 animosities	 incited	 by	 nepotism	 and	 favoritism	 have	 led	 to	 the	 disrepute	 of	
military	and	political	leadership	and	the	provocation	of	violence	among	the	ranks	of	the	security	
force.	 	 Although	 at	 times	 interpreted	 as	 ethnic	 discrimination,	 nepotism	 and	 favoritism	 have	
resulted	 in	the	very	same	violence	which	 instigated	attacks	against	 foreign	forces	and	saw	the	
defection	 and	 desertion	 of	 others.	 	 In	 fact,	 most	 green-on-blue	 incidents	 were	 found	 to	 be	
motivated	largely	by	individual	grievances,	suggesting	that	nepotism	and	favoritism	may	be	one	
underlying	cause	of	insider	attacks	
§ Increasingly	 with	 their	 time-in-service	 nearly	 a	 quarter	 of	 those	 polled	 believe	 that	 ethnic	
discrimination	exists	and	is	a	primary	cause	of	conflict	in	Afghanistan.		Inter-ethnic	and	sectarian	
fraternity	 is	 a	 crucial	 first	 step	 toward	 meeting	 a	 unified	 Afghanistan	 founded	 on	 national	
consciousness.		However,	Afghanistan	has	a	history	of	difficulty	in	meeting	and	maintaining	such	




§ Dependence	 on	 local	 tribal	 leaders	 for	 the	 endorsement	 and	 recommendations	 of	 recruits	
arguably	 is	 a	 process	 built	 on	 patronage	 and	 nepotism	which	 find	 recruits	 torn	 between	 the	
ideology	 of	 their	 patron	 and	 that	 of	 the	 central	 government.	 	 More	 importantly,	 failure	 to	
divorce	 security	 personnel	 from	 ties	 with	 their	 local	 communities	 and	 its	 leadership	 enables	
locally	 held	 ideologies	 to	 persist	 among	 the	 ranks	 of	 security	 personnel	 even	 in	 the	 face	 of	
training	 and	 indoctrination	 aimed	 at	 instilling	 moderate	 ideology.	 	 For	 example,	 competing	
interpretations	 of	 women	 and	 human	 rights	 continue	 to	 find	 those	 in	 the	most	 conservative	
provinces	 approving	 of	 the	 physical	 reprimanding	 of	 women	 and	 the	 complete	 dismissal	 of	
internationally	 accepted	 norms	 and	 values	 as	 un-Islamic.	 	 History	 demonstrates	 an	 all	 too	
customary	tolerance	to	autonomous	rule	in	the	periphery	which	undoubtedly	allows	competing	
ideologies	 to	 persist.	 	 Centralized	 democratic	 governance	 is	 not	 compatible	 with	 such	
fragmented	organization	of	domestic	sovereignty.	 	Not	only	does	the	passive	consent	 for	such	
parallel	 and	 competing	 authority	 directly	 oppose	 and	 contradict	 programs	 set	 up	 to	 drive	
moderate	 behavior	 and	 beliefs	 among	 security	 personnel,	 it	 reflects	 poorly	 on	 the	 level	 of	
compliance	of	the	state	to	internationally	accepted	norms	and	values.	
	
§ Those	 with	 lower	 education	 levels	 tended	 to	 have	 stronger	 radicalized	 ideology,	 such	 as	
intolerance	 of	 other	 religions	 and	 sects	 and	 the	 advocating	 of	 violent	 retaliation	 against	 non-
Muslims.	 	 With	 more	 than	 90%	 of	 recruits	 found	 to	 be	 illiterate,	 such	 correlation	 between	
education	 level	 and	 radicalized	 ideology	 is	 worrying.	 	 Moreover,	 although	 recruits	 have	 to	
participate	 in	 a	 65	 hour	 literacy	 training	 program,	 follow-up	 training	 and	 further	 education	
remains	 limited,	 and	 given	 the	 existence	 of	 nepotism	 and	 favoritism,	 it	 is	 highly	 likely	 that	
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opportunities	 are	mismanaged.	 	Making	matters	worse,	 trainers	 and	mentors	 find	 themselves	




during	 the	May	 2012	 Chicago	 summit	North	Atlantic	 Treaty	Organization	 (NATO)	members	 agreed	 to	






	 personnel,	 which	 is	 estimated	 to	 cost	 $4.1	 billion	 annually	 to	 maintain.	 	 The	
decision	 to	 reduce	 strength	 levels	 remains	based	on	 security	needs	and	at	 the	collective	discretion	of	
both	the	Afghan	government	and	the	international	community.		This	report	finds	that	the	effectiveness	
of	 ongoing	 financial	 support	 is	 limited	 and	may	 in	 fact	 support	 the	 very	 conditions	which	 encourage	
personnel	 to	 submit	 themselves	 to	 radical	 ideology,	 such	 as	 driving	 corruption	 among	 leadership	 or	
empowering	 those	 who	 hold	 competing	 ideological	 beliefs	 with	 financial	 strength.	 	 Meeting	 such	




political	 leadership	 as	 corruption	 is	 seen	 as	 justification	 for	 circumventing	 the	 authority	 of	
security	and	defense	personnel	and	taking	up	arms	against	the	leadership.		Initiatives	aimed	at	
ending	nepotism	and	other	patronage	 links	and	 the	 institution	of	oversight	programs	are	 first	
steps	toward	encouraging	trust	and	reducing	the	likelihood	of	 insurrection	among	the	ranks	of	
the	ANP.	Although	any	program	aimed	at	reducing	and	eliminating	corruption	is	expected	to	be	
met	 with	 provocation	 and	 resistance,	 the	 very	 process	 itself	 demonstrates	 an	 attempt	 to	
institute	 fairness	 among	 the	 ranks	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 may	 help	 to	 reduce	 the	 tensions	 and	
animosities	which	led	to	personnel	taking	up	arms	against	each	other.		Most	importantly,	anti-
corruption	programs	must	be	permanently	 instituted	with	 third	party	oversight,	 rather	 than	a	
temporary	 fix	 managed	 by	 local	 personnel.	 	 This	 is	 key	 to	 limiting	 conflicts	 of	 interest	 and	
maintaining	 neutrality,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 means	 for	 maintaining	 pressure	 against	 potential	
corruption.				
	
§ Should	 revisit	 recruit	 and	 follow-on	 curriculum,	 specifically	 addressing	 the	 development	 of	
national	 consciousness	and	meeting	misunderstandings	over	 the	compatibility	of	 international	
norms	 and	 values	 and	 Afghan	 society	 and	 culture.	 	 Initiatives	 should	 standardize	 training	
programs	which	 indoctrinate	 personnel	 on	 democratic	 values,	 government	 authority,	 and	 the	
role	 of	 its	 security	 and	 defense	 force	 to	 uphold	 the	 law	 and	 maintain	 a	 monopoly	 on	 the	
legitimate	use	of	force.	 	Although	this	study	finds	that	the	culture	and	absorption	rate	of	such	
curriculum	 differs	 across	 provinces	 where	 the	 most	 conservative	 provinces	 will	 demonstrate	





ties	with	 local	 communities	 and	 the	 potential	 for	 ongoing	 ideological	 competition.	 	 Failure	 to	
divorce	 security	 personnel	 from	 ties	 with	 their	 local	 communities	 encourages	 tensions	 and	
competition	 between	 local	 ideologies,	 including	 Taliban	 and	 other	 influences,	 and	 that	 of	 the	
central	 democratic	 government.	 	 Although	a	 very	 sensitive	process	which	 is	 bound	 to	be	met	
with	 resistance,	 it	 is	 the	 first	 step	 toward	breaking	with	 local	 ideological	 competition	 and	 the	
advancement	of	a	national	consciousness.	 	Nonetheless,	 local	tradition	should	be	promoted	as	




with	 the	 influence	 and	 coercion	 tactics	 of	 local	 Taliban	 members.	 	 Whereas	 much	 of	 the	
opposition	against	 insurgent	 forces	has	been	demonstrated	 in	 the	streets	and	mountains	with	
armed	 resistance,	 little	 has	 been	done	 to	meet	with	 the	narratives	 of	 local	 Taliban	members.		
This	 is	 particularly	 so	 with	 regard	 to	 influence/counter	 influence	 narratives	 between	 local	
Taliban	members	 and	 security	 force	personnel.	 	Obviously,	 convincing	 security	personnel	 that	
their	 cause	 is	 a	 just	 one	 is	 a	 first	 step	 toward	 employing	 them	 as	 messengers	 of	 influence,	
however	once	accomplished	counter-influence	 techniques	are	a	 sure	means	 for	extending	 the	





§ Should	oversee	 the	development	of	 initiatives	 aimed	at	 initial	 and	ongoing	evaluations	of	 the	
psychological	health	of	service	members.		Personal	grievances	and	animosities	among	members	







of	 differentiated	 cultures	 inevitably	 will	 lead	 to	 misunderstandings	 and	 misinterpretations.		





which	 address	 concerns	 over	 the	 compatibility	 between	 Islamic	 values	 and	 internationally	
accepted	norms	and	values.	 	 In	particular,	 the	Directorate	of	Religious	Education	and	Training	












This	 annex	 provides	 both	 a	 general	 demographic	 assessment	 and	 distribution	 of	 participants	 and	 a	
broader	survey	of	the	statistical	make-up	of	the	Afghan	National	Security	and	Defense	Force.		A	review	
of	 the	 demographics	 of	 the	 sample	 population	 provides	 the	 requisite	 understanding	 of	 the	 overall	
composition	of	the	ANP	that	is	needed	for	targeted	policy	application.			
Of	 those	polled,	nearly	 three-quarters	had	 served	between	one	and	 four	years	 (68.1%)	with	 the	ANP,	
while	 a	majority	were	 between	 the	 age	 of	 21	 and	 30	 (67.6%)	with	 an	 ethnic	 breakdown	of	 Pashtuns	









Less	 than	 one-tenth	 of	 a	 percent	 completed	 their	 masters’	 degree	 (0.1%).	 	 Comparing	 provinces,	
Nangarhar	 is	the	most	educated	with	25.4%	completing	their	bachelor	degree,	with	Kunduz	(13%)	and	
Kabul	(12.3%)	following	behind.		Nearly	half	the	population	polled	in	Kunduz	(44.2%),	Kabul	(44.9%),	and	





Afghan National Security Force 328,805 
Men 326,805 
Women 2,000 
    
Afghan National Army Total 176,762 
Afghan National Army Regular Units 141,928 
Afghan National Army Special Forces 11,000 
Afghan Army Air Force 7,000 
Afghan National Army Civilians 7,096 
    
Afghan National Police Total 155,182 
Afghan Uniformed Police 95,389 
Afghan National Civil Order Police 15,017 
Afghan Border Police 22,021 
Afghan Anti-Crime Police 3,400 
Afghan Public Protection Force 16, 483 
Afghan Local Police 28,376 
Afghan Special Narcotics Force 2,759 
    
    
Ethnicity (Polled)   
Pashtun 662  
Hazara 346  
Tajik 427  
Uzbek 54  
 Turkmen  15 
 Others 153 
Age (Polled)   
< 21  226 
21 - 30  1120 
31 - 40  258 
41 - 50  38 
51 - 60  14 







For	 this	 study,	 1,498	uniformed	 rank	and	 file	personnel,	 151	 commissioned	officers,	 and	8	uniformed	
religious	 leaders	 based	 across	 11	 provinces	 in	 Afghanistan,	 including	 Balkh,	 Bamyan,	 Ghor,	 Helmand,	
Herat,	 Kabul,	 Qandahar,	 Kunduz,	 Nangarhar,	 Paktia	 and	 Paktika	 completed	 a	 30	 question	 survey	
administered	by	field	researchers.	
	
The	 team	 of	 field	 researchers	 comprised	 of	 twenty-two	 university	 graduates	 of	 political	 science,	
international	 relations,	 law,	 education,	 business,	 literature,	 physics,	 computer	 science,	 sociology,	 and	
journalism	who	have	no	affiliation	with	the	ANDSF,	but	are	local	residence	of	the	province	in	which	they	
conducted	surveys.	 	 In	addition	to	receiving	a	 formal	two	day	training	 in	Kabul	on	research	ethics	and	
procedures,	 each	 field	 researcher	 also	 completed	 an	 ethics	 review	 form	 and	 worked	 under	 the	
supervision	 of	 the	 Head	 of	 the	 Department	 of	 Peace	 Studies.	 	 Field	 researchers	 coordinated	 and	
scheduled	field	surveys	with	the	Directorate	of	Police	and	were	granted	permission	to	visit	a	number	of	
posts	within	each	province.		Surveys	were	first	constructed	in	English	and	then	translated	into	Dari	and	
Pashtu	 for	 distribution	 and	 administration.	 	 In	 addition	 to	 completing	 individual	 surveys,	 each	 field	
researcher	manually	entered	surveys	 into	Excel	spreadsheets	which	were	received	by	 the	Head	of	 the	
Department	of	 Peace	 Studies	where	data	was	 compiled	using	 SPSS	and	 translated	back	 to	 English	 for	
examination.		
	
A	 number	 of	 complications	were	met	 in	 the	 field.	 	 First,	 while	 the	 original	 direction	 of	 this	 research	
aimed	to	examine	both	the	ANP	and	ANA,	difficulty	with	access	to	military	personnel	as	a	consequence	




While	 in	 the	 field,	 researchers	were	also	confronted	by	and	reported	on	a	number	of	difficulties.	 	For	
example,	in	the	third	district	in	Kabul	resistance	was	evident	while	in	one	station	as	members	of	the	ANP	
ask	 for	 compensation	 for	 their	 time.	 	 Similar	 resistance	 was	 reported	 in	 Herat,	 where	 reported	
interviewees	 became	 cautious	 when	 answering	 demographic	 details.	 	 Also,	 although	 researchers	
purposely	 strived	 to	 maintain	 trust	 by	 explaining	 our	 confidentially	 obligations,	 it	 was	 evident	 that	
interviewees	 were	 cautious	 with	 their	 answer,	 particularly	 with	 regard	 to	 questions	 on	 the	 Taliban.		
Reportedly,	caution	was	a	consequence	of	 local	commanders’	 failure	 to	explain	 to	 interviewees	about	
the	project.	 	 In	fact,	when	commanders	explained	to	interviewees,	some	still	remained	uncooperative.		
In	Ghor,	reportedly	some	interviewees	outright	did	not	answer	some	questions	resulted	in	a	handful	of	
‘no	 response’	 answers.	 	 Some,	 such	 as	 in	 Bamyan,	 reported	 did	 not	 initially	 take	 surveys	 seriously,	
especially	as	 they	 remained	committed	 to	 their	daily	 routines.	 	 Such	caution	was	also	 reported	 in	 the	
provinces	of	Balkh.	Another	reported	difficulty	included	illiteracy	and	comprehension	of	questions;	this	
was	reported	in	Nangarhar,	Balkh,	Helmand,	and	Ghor.		Field	researchers	reported	spent	time	explaining	





letters	 from	the	Ministry	of	 Interior,	security	staff	 remained	resistant.	 	Also,	some	questions	were	not	





























































































The	Afghan	 Institute	 for	 Strategic	 Studies	 (AISS)	was	 established	 in	October	 2012	 in	 Kabul.	 It	 aims	 to	
create	an	 intellectual	 space	 for	addressing	 strategic	 issues	pertaining	 to	Afghanistan	 in	wider	 regional	
and	international	contexts.	Promoting	dialogue	between	and	among	different	stakeholders	is	an	end	as	
well	 an	 integral	 means	 in	 attaining	 AISS’	 objectives.	 All	 activities	 and	 programs	 are	 based	 on	 the	
principles	of	professionalism,	independence,	internationalism	and	progressive	values.		
AISS	 is	 an	 independent	 research	 body,	 officially	 registered	with	 the	Afghan	Ministry	 of	 Economy	 as	 a	
not-for-profit	 research	 institute	 dedicated	 to	 providing	 qualitative,	 non-partisan	 and	 policy-oriented	











• Professor	 Shahrbanou	 Tadjbakhsh,	 Chief	 Academic	 Advisor	 at	 the	 Afghan	 Institute	 for	 Strategic	




and	Central	Asia	 in	 the	Office	of	 the	Assistant	Secretary	of	Defense	 for	Asian	and	Pacific	Security	
Affairs;	and	








Canterbury,	 United	 Kingdom.		 He	 also	 attended	 the	 China	 Foreign	 Affairs	 University	 in	 Beijing	 as	 a	
visiting	scholar	with	 its	 school	of	Diplomacy	and	 International	Relations.		Robert	has	 taught	courses	 in	




Lieutenant	 General	 Abdul	 Hadi	 Khalid	 is	 former	 Vice	 Minister	 for	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Interior	
(MoI).		 Prior	 to	 this	 role,	General	Khalid	 served	as	 the	Commanding	Officer	of	 the	Afghan	Special	
Counter-Narcotics	Unit	and	as	Security	Deputy	Minister.		He	attended	the	Afghan	military	academy	
in	 Kabul	 in	 1977	 and	 competed	 his	 MA	 in	 History	 and	 Military	 Pedagogy	 at	 the	 High	 Military	
College	 of	 Minsk	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 between	 1980	 and	 1985.		 He	 is	 also	 a	 visiting	 lecturer	 at	
Dunya	 University	 and	 remains	 a	 senior	 security	 advisor	 to	 the	 Government	 of	 Afghanistan	 and	
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